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TAX INFORMATION DISCLOSURES UNDER THE
GENERATION-SKIPPING TAX:
DUE PROCESS vs. RIGHT OF PRIVACY
MARTHA G. ANDERSON*
PAUL D. FITZPATRICK* *
INTRODUCTION

Prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,1 some taxpayers
were able to avoid estate tax on the transmission of wealth to younger generations by using generation-skipping trusts or equivalent devices. 2 In its simplest
form, a generation-skipping trust provides for an income interest to grantor's
son with the remainder interest to gTantor's grandson. The son's estate pays no
tax on the transfer of the remainder interest since, under traditional property
law concepts, the remainder passes, not from the son, but directly from the
grantor to the grandson.3 Thus, through a relatively simple planning device,
the grantor could provide two generations with the benefit of his wealth and
4
yet manage to "skip" an estate tax on the son's generation.
Generally speaking, only relatively wealthy taxpayers could afford to utilize
such estate planning techniques since a substantial trust corpus would be required to produce adequate lifetime support for the income beneficiary and
still leave a sufficient remainder for the second-generation beneficiary s Also,
because wealthier taxpayers are theoretically subject to higher rates of tax, the
opportunity to avoid taxation at any generational level produces a greater tax
savings for wealthy taxpayers, thereby increasing their incentive to employ such

*B.S., 1971, University of North Carolina; J.D., 1977, University of Florida; LL.M., 1979,
University of Florida; member of The Florida Bar.
*B.A., 1971, Washington State University; J.D., 1977, Gonzaga University; LL.M., 1978,
University of Florida; member of the Washington Bar.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1525 (1976), 1976-3 Vol. 1 C.B. 1-410 (TRA '76).
2. Equivalent devices include legal life estates, estates for years, and certain insurance
policies and annuities. I.R.C. §2611(d)(2). For a more thorough discussion of the types of
equivalent devices see R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION, 913.01(3) (4th ed. 1978). See also I.R.C. §2611(d)(1) which broadly defines "Generation.
Skipping Trust Equivalent" as "any arrangement which, although not a trust, has substantially
the same effect as a generation-skipping trust."
3. Since the life estate or other power terminates upon death, the decedent has no interest
in property to be included in his estate. Or, viewed from another perspective, such interests
which are terminable at death have a value of zero as of the decedent's death so that there
is no value to be included under the basic estate-inclusion section, I.R.C. §2033.
4. The complexity of the generation-skipping schemes devised prior to 1976 seems to
have been limited only by the wealth of the grantor, the ingenuity of his advisors, and the
Rule Against Perpetuities. Dodge, Generation-SkippingTranswers After the Tax Reform Act of

1976, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1265, 1266-67 (1977). Quite commonly, trusts were set up to create
successive beneficial income interests thereby "skipping" estate tax on several generations.
5. Id. at 1268.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1979

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 2
1979]

GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFERS

devices.6 In an attempt to close this "loophole" and to increase tax revenues,7
Congress enacted Chapter 138 of the Internal Revenue Code as part of TRA '76.
Through an exceedingly complex set of rules, Chapter 13 seeks to impose a
transfer tax "substantially equivalent to the estate or gift tax which would
have been imposed if the property had actually been transferred outright to
each successive generation."9 In quest of this theoretical ideal, Congress has
spawned a morass of new terminology and concepts involving hypothetical
transfers and transferors. A very brief look at the mechanics of Chapter 13 and
its new terminology will aid in understanding the Chapter 13 disclosure problems to be discussed in this paper.
OvERvmw oF CHA1Tm_ 13
The basic taxable event under Chapter 13 is designated a "generationskipping transfer"' 1 and may be one of two types: a "taxable distribution"or a "taxable termination."12 Although these terms are fraught with complexities, 13 a taxable distribution is, in general, any distribution of the corpus
of a "generation-skipping trust"'4 to a second-generation beneficiary, 5 and a
taxable termination is the termination of an intervening interest or power1
(by death, lapse or otherwise) in a generation-skipping trust. A major exception
to these generalized definitions is the $250,000 exclusion for distributions or
terminations in favor of the grantor's grandchildren. 7
6.

See SEN. COMM. ON FINANCE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON ADDITIONAL COMM. AMENDMENT

TO H.R. 10612, S. REP. No. 94-938, pt. 2, 2d Sess. 19 (1976), 1976-3 C.B. 661 (hereinafter cited
as SENATE REPORT).

7. Id. at 19-20, 1976-3 C.B. 661-62. Other concepts such as the "neutrality" principle and
"periodicity" notion which underlies the congressional desire to impose a tax on each generation enjoying property are explained in Dodge, supra note 4, at 1267-68.

8. I.R.C. §§2601-2622.
9. SENATE RrORT, supra note 6, at 20, 1976-3 C.B. 662.

10. I.R.C. §2611(a).
11. See I.R.C. §2613(a).
12. See I.R.C. §2613(b). If the same event results in both a taxable termination and a
taxable distribution, the transfer is to be treated as a taxable termination. I.R.C. §2613(b)(7)(A).
13. A detailed analysis of the statutory definitions may be found in R. STEPHENs, G. MAxrmlD,& S. LIND, supra note 2, at f1ff13.03-13.04.

14. A "generation-skipping trust" is any trust having beneficiaries belonging to two or
more generations younger than that of the grantor. I.R.C. §2611(b). See I.R.C. §2611(c) for
rules regarding ascertainment of generation.
15. The statute uses the term "younger-generation beneficiary" to refer to any beneficiary
in a generation younger than that of the grantor. I.R.C. §2613(c)(1). The second-generation
beneficiary, or as he is sometimes referred to "younger-younger generation beneficiary," unfortunately is not given a title in the statute, but instead is referred to in a roundabout
manner as "any younger generation beneficiary who is assigned to a generation younger than
the generation assignment of any other person who is a younger generation beneficiary."

I.R.C. §2613(a)(1).
16. I.R.C. §2613(d) defines "interest" and "power" for Chapter 13 purposes and generally
includes any interest or power, present or future, in income or corpus of the trust. Other provisions, however, effectively restrict the terms to present interests or powers for purposes of
ascertaining whether a taxable distribution or termination has occurred. See I.R.C. §§2613
(a)(1) (last sent.) and 2613(b)(1) (last sent.).
17. See I.R.C. §§2613(a)(4)(A), 2613(b)(5)(A), 2613(b)(6). The limit on the exclusion is
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The tax base is the fair market value of the generation-skipping transfer
determined as of the date of transfer or as of the alternate valuation date, if
applicable. 18 In the case of taxable distributions, the generation-skipping
transfer is the amount of property distributed, "grossed-up" for any generationskipping taxes paid out of such property. 19 For taxable terminations, the tax
base equals the value of the trust property in which the interest or power has
terminated.20

The truly novel concept introduced by Chapter 13 is that of the "deemed
transferor" who is treated as having "transferred" some interest in the generation-skipping trust to a second-generation beneficiary. 21 As will be seen, however, quite often no transfer, in the usual sense of the word, will occur and, in
many instances, the deemed transferor will have no interest to transfer.
In many situations, the deemed transferor will be a parent of the transferee. 22 However, if the parent is not also a younger generation beneficiary of
the trust, and there exists a lineal ancestor of the transferee who is related to
the grantor and who is such a beneficiary, that ancestor will be the deemed
transferor.3 Other situations may arise in which the parent is not a beneficiary,
calculated with reference to each "deemed transferor" (a term explained in text accompanying notes 22-24 infra) and not with reference to each grandchild. There seems to be little
theoretical justification for this rather large "loophole." See discussion in Dodge, supra note 4,
at 1290-91.
18. I.R.C. §2602(d) prescribes the rules for electing the alternate valuation date if the
generation-skipping transfer arises from a taxable termination caused by the death of the
deemed transferor.
19. In the case of taxable distributions, the generation-skipping transfer includes any
generation-skipping tax paid with respect thereto out of the income or corpus of the trust.
I.R.C. §2613(a)(3). See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 46, 53 (1976), 1976-3
C.B. 780, 787 (hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT); Lee, The Tax on Generation-Shipping
Transfers, 14 HOUSTON L. REV. 1021, 1049-50 (1977).
20. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 53, 1976-3 C.B. 787. Often, the entire trust corpus
will be the amount of the generation-skipping transfer; however, situations may arise in which
the separate share rule developed with respect to income taxation of trusts may have to be
applied. Id. at 51, 1976-3 C.B. 785. Discussion of these possibilities and other complexities involving identification of the amount transferred is beyond the scope of this paper. Also see
Dodge, supra note 4, at 1288, n.118 for a more detailed analysis of these matters.
21. See note 15 supra for an explanation of this term.
22. I.R.C. §2612(a)(1).
23. I.R.C. §2612(a)(2). The following example illustrates the §2612(a)(1) general rule for
determining the deemed transferor as well as the exception thereto contained in §2612(a)(2):
Grantor creates a trust with an income interest for life to Son (S) and remainder interest
to Great-Grandson (GGS). Grandson (GS) is given no beneficial interest in the trust.
Upon the transfer of the remainder interest to GGS, the general rule of §2612(a)(1)
provides that GS would be the deemed transferor since he is the parent of the transferee, GGS.
However, §2612(a)(2) provides that an individual other than a parent of the transferee
will be the deemed transferor under the following circumstances: (1) the parent is not a
younger generation beneficiary; (2) an ancestor of the transferee is related by blood or
adoption to the grantor; and (3) such ancestor is a younger generation benficiary.
In the example given, all of these tests are met. GS is not a younger generation beneficiary, and S is related to the garntor and is also a younger generation beneficiary. Therefore,
the exception of §2612(a)(2) applies and S is the deemed transferor.
It should be noted that even though GS is not a younger generation beneficiary, he would
be the deemed transferor if S had not satisfied the other requirements of §2612(a)(2).
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and yet there is also no other ancestor who qualifies to be the deemed transferor.
In such cases, the general rule for determining the deemed transferor will apply
to make the parent of the transferee the deemed transferor even though the
24
parent has no connection, beneficial or otherwise, with the trust.
Considering the often attenuated connection of the deemed transferor with
the generation-skipping trust, Congress wisely did not seek to extract the
generation-skipping tax from the deemed transferor. 25 Instead, the tax is to be
paid out of the trust fund,26 using the deemed transferor's marginal transfer
tax rate as the measuring rod for computing the tax.27 Under section 2602(a)
the amount of the tax is the excess of 1) a tentative tax on the sum of the
deemed transferor's taxable estate2 8 and lifetime taxable gifts and generationskipping transfers including the current generation-skipping transfer over and
2) a tentative tax on the sum of the same items excluding the current generation-skipping transfer. The deemed transferor's unified tax rates under section
2001(c) are the applicable rates.29
Of particular importance is the fact that the person required to make the
generation-skipping tax return is not the deemed transferor, the one whose tax
history determines the rate of tax. In taxable distributions, the distributee is
required to file the return 0 and may be held personally liable for nonpayment
of the tax s1 up to the fair market value of the property received by the distributee. 2 In taxable terminations, the trustee must prepare the return 33 and will
be personally liable for the entire tax if it is not paid when due.34
This brief summary of the mechanics of Chapter 13 highlights the unusual
features of the new tax - the creation of a hypothetical transfer by a deemed
transferor coupled with a vicarious taxing system in which the deemed transferor's tax history determines the rate of tax imposed on the transfer of assets
to another taxpayer. In striving for a theoretically egalitarian 5 system of taxing
24. See note 23 supra. In the example given above, GS has no interest in the trust and
cannot, under any interpretation of the word, be said to have "transferred" anything to GGS,
and yet Chapter 13 will tax this generation-skipping "transfer."

25. Any attempt to tax the deemed transferor on property passing to another taxpayer
would undoubtedly have run afoul of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Cf.,
Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n of Wisconsin, 284 U.S. 206, 215 (1931) (taxation of husband on wife's

income): "[A]ny attempt by a state to measure the tax on one person's property or income by
reference to the property or income of another is contrary to due process of law . . "
26. "[rMhe tax would generally be paid out of the proceeds of the trust property." SENATE
REPoRT, supra note 6, at 20, 1976-3 C.B. 662.
27.

Id.

28. Of course, if the deemed transferor is alive at the time of the generation-skipping
transfer, the taxable estate element would be excluded from the computation. See I.R.C.
§2602(a)(1)(D).
29. I.R.C. §2602(a)(1).
30. I.R.C. §2621(c)(1)(A)(i).
31. I.R.C. §2603(a)(1)(B).
32. Id. §2603(a)(3). Additionally, the tax becomes a lien on the property distributed. I.R.C.

§2603(b).
33. Id. §2621(c)(1)(A)(ii).
34. Id. §2603(a)(1)(A), subject to certain limitations found in I.R.C. §2603(a)(2) and discussed herein in text accompanying notes 69 and 75-76 infra.
35. The Senate Report clearly indicates that one of the goals of the new tax is to provide
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generation-skipping transfers, Congress has apparently overlooked some of the
practical and constitutional difficulties inherent in implementing the new tax.
In order to prepare the return and compute the tax imposed by Chapter 13,
the taxpayer 36 must have detailed financial information about the deemed
transferor.3 Quite often the taxpayer will not have access to the information
without the consent of the deemed transferor or his executor, and, in many
situations, the deemed transferor or his executor will be very reluctant to disclose such personal information.
An examination of the informational requirements of the taxpayer as well
as the means available for obtaining such information reveals that Chapter 13
creates a serious conflict between the taxpayer's need to know the tax history of
the deemed transferor and the deemed transferor's right to refuse disclosure of
such personal information. At a conceptual level, this conflict may be described
as a dynamic tension between the due process rights of the taxpayer and the
privacy rights of the deemed transferor. 38 The tension is indeed dynamic because the more information sought by the taxpayer, the greater the potential
invasion of the deemed transferor's privacy; conversely, the more information
withheld by the deemed transferor, the greater the potential violation of the
taxpayer's due process rights. This paper will examine the parameters of this
conflict, the existing statutory treatment of the conflict, and alternatives for
minimizing the conflict.
PARAMETERS OF THE CONFLICT

InformationalNeeds of the Taxpayer
To understand the extent of the disclosural problems created by Chapter 13,
it is first necessary to examine the information required to compute the
generation-skipping tax. Although the statutory formula is complex, 3

9

in net

effect, the tax is simply the product of two components - a tax base multiplied
by a tax rate.
The tax base is the fair market value of the generation-skipping transfer.40

neutrality of estate and gift tax laws by preventing further undermining of the progressivity
of the taxes by wealthy individuals using generation-skipping devices. SENATE REPORT, supra

note 6, at 20, 1976-3 C.B. 662.
36. For the sake of simplicity, this paper will use the term "taxpayer" to indicate the
party responsible for computing and paying the tax unless there is a need to distinguish between the trustee and the distributee in this role.
37. See discussion in text accompanying notes 39-65 infra.
38. The American Bar Association has recognized the existence of such a conflict and the
need for some statutory clarifications and resolutions. See ABA SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AND RESPONSIBILITIES COMM. ON TAXATION
SUBSTANTIVE

AND

ITS RELATION TO HUMAN RIGHTS, SUBCOMM. ON

NON-FEDERAL TAXES AND FEDERAL TAXES OTHER THAN THE INCOME TAX, REPORT ON

TAX INFORMATION DIscLOsuREs REQUIRED FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE TAX
ERATION-SKIPPING

TRANsFERS, January 13, 1978 (hereinafter cited as ABA

ON CERTAIN GEN-

REPORT).

39. The basic formula is contained in I.R.C. §2602(a) and is explained in text accompanying notes 47-60 infra.
40. See I.R.C. §2602(a)(1)(A) and HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 53-54, 1976-3 C.B.
787-88. See also discussion in text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
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As previously noted,41 an actual, physical transfer is not required to trigger the
generation-skipping provisions, but instead, a mere shift in or termination of
an interest or power may be the triggering event.42 Consequently, the identification of the taxable event, as well as assessing its fair market value, may present
significant problems for the person charged with preparing the generationskipping tax return.4 3 Nevertheless, the taxpayer, whether a trustee, "trustee
equivalent,"4 4 or a distributee, should be able to solve these problems by resorting to the trust agreement or its equivalent, the provisions of Chapter 13,
and, if necessary, professional appraisals. In short, all of the resource data
necessary to determine the tax base can be obtained by the taxpayer without
directly consulting the deemed transferor.
One major exception to the foregoing, however, deals with the grandchild
exclusion. Within the $250,000 limitation, any transfer to a grandchild of the
grantor is not a taxable generation-skipping transfer.45 Since the limitation is
calculated per deemed transferor,4 6 the taxpayer must know the amount of the
exclusion that has been used up on prior generation-skipping transfers of the
deemed transferor in order to determine the remainder available for offset
against the current transfer. This requires a knowledge of the dates, amounts,
and transferees of all of the deemed transferor's prior generation-skipping
transfers - information which may be difficult to obtain.
The determination of the tax rate will nearly always involve considerable
intrusion into the personal background of the deemed transferor. Section
2602(a), the basic computational provision, prescribes a formula designed to
result in taxation of the generation-skipping transfer at the deemed transferor's
highest marginal transfer tax rate. 47 The marginal tax rate is the Section

41. See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
42. See, e.g., I.R.C. §2613(b)(1).
43. An example may illustrate some of the problems posed by the intricacies of Chapter
13. G creates a trust with income payable to W, his wife, for life and granting discretionary
power to the trustee to invade corpus for the benefit of son, S, during the term of the trust,
remainder to grandson, GS.If S predeceases W, S's interest in the trust has terminated under
property law concepts; nevertheless, a taxable termination under Chapter 13 has not taken
place. Instead, the taxable termination with respect to S's interest is deemed to occur upon
the death of W. See I.R.C. 2613(b)(2)(C); R. STPUENs, G. MAXFIELD, & S. LiND, supra note 2,

at f 12.03(2)(e).
44. A "trustee equivalent" or "substitute trustee" is the logical corallary of a "generationskipping trust equivalent" defined in I.R.C. §2611(d); however, it is often quite difficult to
identify just who a trustee equivalent might be. For example, I.R.C. §2611(d)(2) specifically
lists an annuity as a possible generation-skipping trust equivalent. If D purchases a commercial annuity with payments to son, S, for his life and remaining payments to be paid to
GS for his life, who is the trustee equivalent? Who will be xesponsible for preparing the
generation-skipping tax return upon S's death? The most logical party is the insurance com-

pany from whom the annuity was purchased. Similarly, in the case of legal life estates that
may be considered generation-skipping trust equivalents, is the legal life tenant, or his personal representative, the trustee equivalent? These questions axe discussed in greater detail in
R. STEPHENs, G. MAxFIELD, & S. LiND, supra note 2, at 113.01(3).
45. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
46. Id.

47. "The net effect is that the generation-skipping transfer is taxed at the marginal
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2001(c) rate applicable to the sum of the items comprising the deemed transferor's marginal transfer tax rate base. 48
The first item in the marginal transfer tax rate base is the current generation-skipping transfer.4 1 As noted above,5 0 most of the information necessary to
compute the amount of this transfer should be obtainable directly by the
taxpayer.
The second item involved is the aggregate fair market value of all prior
generation-skipping transfers. 51 If the taxpayer has filed the tax returns for all
the previous generation-skipping transfers of the deemed transferor, he will be
52
reasonably sure of having the information available to compute this amount.
However, since the deemed transferor's prior transfers may have involved many
different generation-skipping trusts or trust equivalents, a taxpayer can never be
certain that he has all of the deemed transferor's generation-skipping transfers
before him for consideration. This uncertainty is compounded by the fact that
the deemed transferor himself may not be aware of all the generation-skipping
transfers with which he has been "credited."' 5
The third component of the marginal transfer tax rate base is the deemed

transfer tax rate of the deemed transferor." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 19, at 55, 1976-3 C.B.
789.
48. The term "marginal transfer tax rate base" is not used in the Internal Revenue Code
but was used in the Conference Committee Report to describe the sum of the deemed transferor's lifetime gifts (including generation-skipping transfers) and taxable estate, to which the
unified transfer tax rate of §2001(c) is applied. CONF. REP., H.R. REP. No. 94-1515, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 614, 617 (1976), 1976-3 C.B. 964, 967 (hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT).
49. I.R.C. §2602(a)(1)(A).
50. See text accompanying notes 40-44 supra.
51. I.R.C. §2602(a)(1)(B).
52. Even under such circumstances, the taxpayer may not be able simply to pull the
values off the prior generation-skipping tax returns. I.R.C. §2602(a)(1)(B) states parenthetically
that the fair market value to be used is that "determined for purposes of this chapter." If the
value used in the prior return was for any reason incorrect, presumably a later-determined
corrected value would be used in computing this second item for subsequent generationskipping transfers. See R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD, & S. LIND, supra note 2, at 12.03(3).
A related problem is created by I.R.C. §2602(e) which provides that if a generation-skipping
transfer occurs within three years of the death of the deemed transferor, the tax on such a
transfer shall be computed as though the transfer occurred after the death of the deemed
transferor. That is, the cumulative lifetime and death transfers, and not just the transfers as
of the actual date of the generation-skipping transfer, shall be taken into account in computing the marginal rate of tax on that generation-skipping transfer. No regulations have yet
been issued on the procedures to be followed, but presumably, the taxpayer would have to
file an amended return reflecting the increased tax rate once he learned that the subject
generation-skipping transfer had occurred within the three-year period. See CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 48, at 617, 1976-3 C.B. 967.
53. It is entirely possible that a deemed transferor will have no beneficial interest in the
generation-skipping trust involved. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra. Consequently,
the deemed transferor may have no idea that such a trust exists, much less that he is the
deemed transferor for any transfer made from the trust.
Alternatively, the deemed transferor may be aware of his beneficial interest in an annuity
contract or legal life estate, but may not be aware that this arrangement qualifies as a
generation-skipping trust equivalent and is therefore subject to the provisions of Chapter 13.
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transferor's lifetime adjusted taxable gifts.54 If the deemed transferor has filed
gift tax returns and is willing to make them available to the taxpayer, gathering
this information will present few problems. If, however, the gift tax returns
are unavailable for any reason, the taxpayer is faced with the task of discovering
the dates, amounts, and donees of the gifts and must also determine whether
the deemed transferor's spouse participated in making the gift 55 in order to
compute the deemed transferor's adjusted lifetime taxable gifts. Understandably, many deemed transferors will be reluctant to disclose this detailed information to a Chapter 13 taxpayer with whom he may have no connection.
If the deemed transferor is dead at the time of the generation-skipping
transfer, the taxpayer must know a fourth element - the deemed transferor's
taxable estate. 6 The taxpayer may not have access to the deemed transferor's
estate tax return for several reasons. First, if the gross estate was less than
$175,000, no estate tax return will have been required to be filed. 57 Secondly,
the personal representative of the deceased deemed transferor may refuse to
disclose the estate tax return to the taxpayer. Without access to the estate tax
return the taxpayer is confronted with the formidable, if not impossible, task of
gathering the detailed data necessary to compute the deemed transferor's taxable estate.58
Even if the estate tax return is made available to the taxpayer, Chapter 13
may require certain modifications in the taxable estate as shown on the return.
Section 2602(c)(5)(A) requires that any generation-skipping transfer occurring
at or within nine months of the deemed transferor's death must be included in
the value of the deemed transferor's gross estate, but only for purposes of determining the maximum marital deduction. Thus, any generation-skipping
transfer falling within the time limits would generally increase the maximum
marital deduction and correspondingly decrease the taxable estate component
of the deemed transferor's marginal transfer tax rate base.59
The taxpayer must have a copy of the deemed transferor's will in order to
compute the exact effect of section 2602(c)(5)(A) on the marital deduction. This
presents little difficulty when the taxpayer has access to a complete estate tax
54. I.R.C. §2602(a)(1)(C).
55. See generally I.R.C. §§2501-2524 for provisions regarding computation of taxable inter

vivos gifts.
56. I.R.C. §2602(a)(1)(D).
57. For estates of decedents dying after December 31, 1976, the personal representative
need not file a return if the gross estate is less than $175,000 (disregarding transitional
rules). I.R.C. §6018. See also note 65 infra.
58. In cases where an estate tax return has been filed, the possibility of obtaining disclosure of that return directly from the Internal Revenue Service is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 101-139 infra.
59. "Generally, the result will be that the maximum allowable marital deduction will increase, the transfer tax payable with respect to the deemed transferor's estate will decrease,
and the deemed transferor's marginal rate bracket will also decrease (thus reducing, indirectly, the tax that will be payable with respect to the property passing under the generation-skipping transfer.)" HousE REPORT, supra note 19, at 54, 1976-3 C.B. 788.
It is not entirely certain whether the increase in the marital deduction also works a decrease in the taxable estate for estate tax purposes. See R. STPENS, G. MAXFIELD, & S. LiND,
supra note 2, at !12.03(7)(b) regarding this ambiguity.
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return because a copy of the will is required to be filed with the return; 60 however, as discussed above, the taxpayer may not always have such access.
In addition to the basic information needed to compute the marginal tax
rate base, the taxpayer must also obtain the information necessary to calculate
the specific credits allowed by section 2602(c). These credits include the section
2013 credit for tax on prior transfers 6l and the credit for state inheritance taxes
62
paid with respect to a generation-skipping transfer.
In addition, a deduction for the unused portion of the deemed transferor's
unified credit is allowed if the generation-skipping transfer occurs at or after
the death of the deemed transferor. 63 In cases in which no estate tax return was
required to be filed (and no other gifts or generation-skipping transfers had
been made), it would seem that the taxpayer could simply deduct the full
amount of the deemed transferor's unified credit; however, this is not the case.
Section 2602(c)(3)(A) requires that the tax that would have been imposed by
section 2001 be deducted from the total available credit to arrive at the unused portion to be offset against Chapter 13 taxes. 64 In effect, this requires that
the estate tax under section 2001 be computed and deducted from the total
unified credit.6 5 Therefore, the taxpayer under Chapter 13 must be able to
determine the amount of estate tax attributable to the deemed transferor's
estate, even if no estate tax return was required to be filed.

60. See Internal Revenue Service Form 706.

61. I.R.C. §2602(c)(4).
62. Id. §2602(c)(5)(C).
63. Id. §2602(c)(3). When fully phased-in in 1981, the unified credit will be $47,000. Id.
§2010(a).
64. See R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD, & S. LIND, supra note 2,

12.03(8)(a).

65. This computation is understandable when one considers that the rationale behind
I.R.C. §6018, permitting gross estates under $175,000 not to file estate tax returns, is that any
estate tax that would have been due on a gross estate of that amount would have been offset
by the full $47,000 unified credit.
An example may be helpful. Decedent dies in 1981, leaving a gross estate of $175,000. No
other deductions, expenses or credits are available.
Under I.R.C. §2001 his estate tax would be zero:
Gross estate
Deductions
Taxable estate

$175,000
-0$175,000

Tentative Tax
Unified Credit
Estate Tax Due

46,800
47,0000
$ -0-

(§2001(c))

*Assuming no portion of the unified credit had been used
up by prior gifts or generation-skipping transfers.
Since no estate tax would be due on a gross estate of $175,000 or less, I.R.C. §6018 simply
permits the executor to forego the formality of filing an estate tax return.
If, after his death, a generation-skipping transfer is attributed to the decedent, the unused portion of the unified credit for I.R.C. §2602(c)(3) purposes would be $200 ($47,000 $46,800).
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SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Voluntary Disclosure by the Deemed Transferor
Having considered the potential informational needs of the Chapter 13
taxpayer, it is necessary to consider the possible sources for obtaining this information. The most obvious source is the deemed transferor himself; however,
this is a viable alternative only when the deemed transferor is alive at the date
of the transfer,66 he has maintained complete and accurate records, and he is
willing to make these records available to the taxpayer. The personal and detailed nature of the required information will make most deemed transferors
reluctant to supply the data -a natural reluctance that would only be exacerbated if the taxpayer were an institutional trustee or other trustee personally unknown to the deemed transferor or if the deemed transferor had no
67
personal financial interest in the trust.
Significantly, even the existence of a cooperative deemed transferor may not
alleviate all of the informational problems of the taxpayer. First, the deemed
transferor may not possess the information necessary to compute his own
marginal transfer tax rate base. This is a particular reality with respect to any
prior generation-skipping transfers - many of which the deemed transferor may
not be aware have occurred. 68 Secondly, any of the tax returns that a deemed
transferor might supply may be inaccurate. Presumably, since the prior tax
figures are used only in determining the marginal rate to be applied against the
current generation-skipping transfer, the Internal Revenue Service would require the use of corrected amounts in computing the current tax rate even
though the prior tax years involved were closed.6 9 Thus, it appears that the
Chapter 13 taxpayer will rarely encounter that perfect combination of circumstances - cooperation, completeness, and accuracy - that will enable him to
obtain all the information he needs from the deemed transferor. To what other
sources, then, may the taxpayer turn?
Disclosure UnderSection 2603(aX2)
Section 2603(a)(2) may provide a partial answer to the information gathering
needs of the Chapter 13 taxpayer. This section limits the personal liability of
the trustee who relies on the tax rates and remaining grandchild exclusion
furnished him by the Internal Revenue Service.70 Thus, although primarily a
66. If the deemed transferor were dead at the time of the generation-skipping transfer,
the taxpayer might seek the information from the personal representative of the deemed
transferor; however, the personal representative, as a fiduciary, may also be unwilling to disclose the financial affairs of his decedent.
67. Consider, for example, a father who is not an annuitant under a commercial annuity
but is nonetheless a deemed transferor because he is the parent of the second-generation
annuitant. If the annuity company is considered a trustee equivalent and must prepare the
Chapter 13 tax return, must the father supply the annuity company with his gift tax returns or, in the alternative, with the information necessary to compute his lifetime taxable

gifts?
68.
69.
70.

See text accompanying note 53 supra.
See R. SrrPHENs, G. MAxIELD, & S. LiN, supra note 2, f12.03(3).
I.R.C. §2603(a)(2) states:
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liability limiting provision, section 2603(a)(2) implies that the Internal Revenue
Service will furnish the deemed transferor's marginal transfer tax rate as well
as his remaining grandchild exclusion-l to trustee taxpayers.
This implication is supported by the congressional authorization for the
Secretary of the Treasury to "establish procedures whereby the person required
to file a return ... may receive information from the Service concerning the
deemed transferor's marginal tax rate base, and other information which is
72
necessary in order to properly prepare the return (or any refund claim)."
Thus far, however, the Secretary has not issued any regulations or procedures.
Until implementing procedures or regulations are adopted, the congressional
language must be viewed merely as a grant of authority to the Internal Revenue
Service to establish its own procedures and as an aid to interpreting section
2603(a)(2).
Section 2603(a)(2) presents the Chapter 13 taxpayer with many unanswered
questions. Primarily, who may request the rates? The statute clearly limits the
personal liability of trustees only; however, there is no definition of "trustee"
in Chapter 13 or elsewhere in the Internal Revenue Code. It is uncertain, therefore, whether "trustee equivalents,"7 3 such as insurance companies funding
generation-skipping annuities, would be entitled to information under section
2603(a)(2). Since the primary purpose of section 2603(a)(2) is to limit liability,
it would appear that anyone whose liability is to be limited by that section,
presumably including such trustee equivalents, should be entitled to request
the release of rates as well.
However, this rationale does not answer the question of whether distributee
taxpayers are precluded from requesting the release of rates. The personal
liability of a distributee is limited by section 2603(a)(3) to the fair market value
of the property received.74 This section makes no mention of any release of
rates by the Internal Revenue Service. The omission may be interpreted as the
result of a congressional conclusion that a distributee is better able than a
trustee to obtain the information regarding the deemed transferor's tax history
necessary to compute the generation-skipping tax without resort to the Internal
Revenue Service. Since the distributee will always be a relative of the deemed
transferor, the deemed transferor might be more willing to provide the distributee with his personal tax history. However, this does not take into account
the considerable likelihood that either the deemed transferor may be unable to
(2) LIMITATION OF PERSONAL LIABILITY OF TRUSTEE WHO RELIES ON CERTAIN INFORMATION FURNISHED BY THE SECRETARY -

(A) INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO RATES - The trustee shall not be personally liable
for any increase in the tax imposed by section 2601 which is attributable to the application to the transfer of rates of tax which exceed the rates of tax furnished by the Secretary to the trustee as being the rates at which the transfer may reasonably be expected
to be taxed.
71. The information regarding the tax rates of the deemed transferor and the remaining
grandchild exclusion will hereinafter be referred to simply as "rates" or "tax rates."
72. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 617, 1976-3 C.B. 967.
73. See note 44 supra.
74. See discussion in text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
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provide the necessary information or that the deemed transferor might be more
reluctant to disclose his financial affairs to a relative than to an unrelated
trustee. 75 The House Report states that "to minimize any undue administrative
burden or hardship on the trustee. .. , the trustee is permitted to file a request
with the Internal Revenue Service for information concerning the transfer
tax rate bracket of the deemed transferor." 76 No similar comment is made with
regard to distributees, yet it is difficult to see how a distributee, faced with
gathering all the data necessary to compute the deemed transferor's tax rates, is
not likewise under an "undue administrative burden or hardship."
The failure to specifically mention the release of rates to distributees may
not reflect congressional consideration of the relative administrative burdens as
much as it does congressional acknowledgment of the differences in the economic realities behind personal liability for the generation-skipping tax. Although not specifically stated, it appears that the main purpose in holding the
trustee personally responsible for the tax is to assure his compliance with the
administrative requirements of preparing the tax return and paying the tax out
of the trust fund. 7 The trustee is charged with this responsibility only upon
taxable terminations, 78 and taxable terminations will often result in a complete
distribution of the trust corpus to the ultimate beneficiary.79 Since the trustee
will pay the tax out of the trust fund before distributing the remainder, he will
have no funds remaining from which to pay any later-assessed tax. Thus, section
2603(a)(2) may represent the congressional conclusion that it would be unfair
to hold a trustee personally liable for any increased tax due to undetected
errors in the deemed transferor's tax rates. In order for this policy to be
equitable, the trustee must not be responsible for any error in the rates; hence,
he must be supplied with the rates by a source upon whom he is justified in
relying - the Internal Revenue Service.
Congress sought to protect distributees by another route. Section 2603(a)(3)
limits the personal liability of distributees to the fair market value (as of the
date of distribution) of the property received. Thus, in theory, the distributee
should have a fund from which to pay any subsequently assessed tax attributable to an error in rates. Consequently, there is no economic reason to limit
further the distributee's personal liability by supplying him with rates. However, this rationale overlooks one practical problem. Section 2603(b) attaches a
lien to the property until the tax is "paid in full or becomes unenforceable by
reason of lapse of time." The lien amount is not limited to the fair market
75. In some cases a relative would be in a better position to, or would have a greater
motivation to, make an adverse use of financial information of the deemed transferor than
would be an unrelated trustee. If, for example, a deemed transferor had made gifts to some

of his children and had excluded others and wished to keep this information from the excluded children, the deemed transferor would be understandably reluctant to release his gift

tax returns to an excluded child who also happened to be a Chapter 13 taxpayer.
76. HousE REPORT, supra note 19, at 57-58, 1976-3 C.B. 791-792.
77. See I.R.C. §2621(c)(1)(A)(ii) and text accompanying note 26 supra.
78. I.R.C. §2621(c)(1)(A)(ii).
79. For example, the simplest generation-skipping trust in which a grantor establishes a

trust with income to Son for his life and remainder to Grandson, the death of Son will be a
taxable termination and will also terminate the trust entirely.
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value of the property at the time of distribution;80 hence, the distributee may
be forced to pay the full amount of any tax due even though it exceeds his
personal liability under section 2603(a)(3), in order to prevent the sale of the
property to satisfy a government tax lien.8 '
The foregoing discussion indicates that section 2603(a)(2) is simply not responsive to the question of who may request rates from the Internal Revenue
Service. The distributee has virtually the same administrative and economic
reasons to request and rely on rates from the Internal Revenue Service as does
the trustee, yet Congress apparently has not considered these needs.
A second question which section 2603(a)(2) fails to address is whether the
Internal Revenue Service is under a duty to comply with a request for rates.
If the function of releasing the rates is merely to reduce the "administrative
burden" on the trustee, 2 then must the trustee first allege and prove an inability to obtain the rates from other sources such as the deemed transferor
himself?
Furthermore, if the ticket to limited liability under the statute is reliance
upon the rates furnished by the Service, every prudent trustee will request and
rely on such rates in order to protect himself. Congress may not have contemplated such a wholesale reliance on Internal Revenue Service data and
personnel; nonetheless, it would be inequitable for the Internal Revenue Service to deny requests for rates when limited liability is dependent on reliance on
such rates.
A third significant question raised by section 2603(a)(2) concerns the extent
of the information included in the rates. The previous discussion regarding the
detailed information making up the deemed transferor's marginal transfer tax
rate clearly indicates that in many circumstances the release of the rate alone
will be insufficient to properly compute the tax. For instance, how will the
taxpayer determine the deemed transferor's unused unified credit to offset
against the generation-skipping tax unless the Internal Revenue Service supplies the information necessary for its computation? 3 Furthermore, how can
when no estate tax return
the Internal Revenue Service supply this information
4
was required to be filed for the deemed transferor?
Aside from these functional questions left open by section 2603(a)(2), a
serious constitutional question exists whether the taxpayer must be satisfied
with the release of tax rates or whether he may demand the release of the
underlying data necessary to verify the accuracy of the rates. Imposing the
generation-skipping tax based on rates that the taxpayer is not allowed to
verify may be a denial of due process. In an analogous situation, a statute that
imposed a tax upon an assumption of fact which the taxpayer was forbidden
to controvert was found unconstitutional.8 5 The inability to determine the
80. Both the I.R.C. §6324(a)(1) lien for estate taxes and the I.R.C. §6324(b) lien for gift
taxes are for the amount of the taxes "imposed" and extend for ten years from the date of the
taxable event.
81. Lee, supra note 19, at 1050.
82. See quote in text accompanying note 74 supra.
83. See discussion of this problem in text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
84. See discussion in text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
85. During a period in which the federal gift tax had been repealed, Congress enacted
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accuracy of the tax rates could lead to the payment of excessive taxes. If the
burden of the extra taxes falls on the trust fund, then the trust beneficiaries
may have a claim that their property has been taken without due process of
law.8 6
A trustee taxpayer may also have a due process claim arising from an inability to contest the rates. Section 2603(a)(2) limits liability only for the use of
inaccurately low rates;8 7 however, a trustee or other fiduciary may be liable to
the trust beneficiaries for the payment of excessive tax out of the trust fund
resulting from an unquestioning use of rates that are too high.s

Although a fiduciary normally may rely on the advice of experts in matters
requiring technical expertise, s 9 he may not safely do so if such reliance is unreasonable under the circumstances. 90 The reasonableness of a wholesale re-

liance on tax rates supplied by the Internal Revenue Service is open to question
for several reasons. In most cases the deemed transferor's returns used by the,

Internal Revenue Service in determining the rates will not have been audited; 91
therefore, the trustee who uses such rates is actually relying on the deemed
transferor's own attestation of accuracy rather than on any imprimatur of the
Internal Revenue Service. Additionally, the amount and complexity of the
92
data potentially comprising a deemed transferor's marginal transfer tax rate
presents ample possibility for error by the Internal Revenue Service even if the
returns have been reviewed. Even if the trustee is unable to obtain the necessary
I.R.C. §302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926, which created an irrebuttable presumption that all
gifts made within two years of death were made in contemplation of death and were therefore
includable in the donor's taxable estate. The Supreme Court found this irrebuttable presumption so "arbitrary and unreasonable" that it violated the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 325 (1932).
86. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. If it could be proved that an excessive tax was paid out of the
trust fund because of an inability to verify government-supplied rates, the excessive tax would
seem to be an unconstitutional taking of property under the fifth amendment. Cf. Acker v.
C.I.R., 258 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1958), aff'd, 361 U.S. 87 (1959).
87. See text of statute in note 38 supra.
88. See In re Forrestal's Estate, 10 Pa. D 9- C 152 (Orphans' Ct. 1928) (executor surcharged for overpayment of tax caused by using rates that were too high). Many cases have
held that the burden of proof is on the trustee to show that money expended by him, including taxes paid, was a proper disbursement. See, e.g., Benbow v. Benbow, 117 Fla. 37, 157
So. 512 (1934).
89. A. Scorr, TRusTs §177 (3d ed. 1967). See also In re First National Bank, 37 Ohio St.
2d 60, 307 N.E. 2d 23 (1974) (dissenting opinion); Calvin v. Cavanaugh, 324 Mass. 758, 88
N.E. 2d 339 (1949); and In re Estate of Lohm, 440 Pa. 268, 269 A.2d 451 (1970).
90. "A trustee does not conclusively show that he has used reasonable care when he consults an expert, such as a lawyer or investment counsellor, and then follows the advice given.
It may have been unreasonable to take advice from the party in question, or the advice may
have been such that a reasonable man, in obeying his duty to evaluate the advice and consider
the reasons given for it, would have known that it was not good advice." G. BOGaRT, LAW OF
TRusTs §93 (Sth ed. 1973).
91. There are no statutory provisions in Chapter 13 providing for Internal Revenue
Service checks on the accuracy of deemed transferors' tax returns. Therefore, it is assumed that
these returns will be subjected to audit only with the same frequency as are all returns filed
with the Service.
92. See discussion of the elements in the deemed transferor's rate base in text accompanying notes 48-60 supra.
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tax information elsewhere and is forced to depend on the rates supplied by the
Internal Revenue Service, at least one court would surcharge the trustee for
any overpayment of tax caused by a failure to question the rates.9 3 Therefore,
it is at least arguable that a failure to test or question the reasonableness of the
rates furnished by the Internal Revenue Service would be a breach of the
trustee's duty to exercise reasonable care if not also a breach of his duty to
defend and preserve the trust assets against unjustified claims.14
In addition to violating the taxpayer's due process rights, refusal by the
Internal Revenue Service to release the underlying data supporting the tax
rates would undermine this country's adversary taxing system in which the
government and the taxpayer "can argue over the amount of tax due based on
information available to each.' ' g If the Internal Revenue Service releases the
rate but does not release the underlying information upon which the rate was
determined, the taxpayer has no way of checking the accuracy of the rate provided nor of knowing when he should object to the rate and perhaps try to
obtain the necessary verification from other sources. 96 Thus, a release of the
deemed transferor's tax rates alone will not satisfy the practical needs nor the
constitutional rights of Chapter 13 taxpayers.
What additional information may be released under section 2603(a)(2) remains unclear. In enacting Chapter 13 Congress authorized the Internal Revenue Service to adopt procedures to supply "other information which is necessary in order to properly prepare the return." 97 But as previously noted, this
"other information" has yet to be defined by either the Internal Revenue Service or Congress.9"
93. In re Jones' Estate, 400 Pa. 545, 162 A.2d 408 (1960). This case involved an appraisal
of estate assets by state inheritance tax officials. The executor had reason to believe the assets
were overvalued but failed to appeal from the final appraisal. The court sustained a surcharge
against the executor for failure to appeal. Id. at 553-54, 162 A.2d at 412-13. Contra, Maynard
v. Maynard's Adm'r, 251 Ky. 246, 250-51, 64 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Ct. App. 1933) (good faith payment in reliance on valuation absolved executor).
Although both of the cited cases involved executors, the fiduciary duty of due care owed
by executors and trustees is generally held to be identical. See RFSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TRusTs §6, comment a (1959).
94. "But in the case where the taxing authorities have set the valuation, the duty confronting the executor is not so much a duty to administer tax matters with due care, as it is a
duty to defend and preserve the estate against unjustified claims." Comment, Surcharging an
Executor for Negligent Administration of Tax Responsibilities, 45 TEmP. L.Q. 42, 55 (1971).
95. ABA REPORT, supra note 38, at 4. See also, e.g., I.R.C. §6211 authorizing deficiency
assessments by the Internal Revenue Service and I.R.C. §6213 authorizing taxpayers to petition
tax court for redetermination of any deficiency.
96. Cf., Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614 (1976) (requiring the government to plead
(or allow discovery of) specific facts to support a jeopardy assessment rather than requiring
the taxpayer to prove that under no circumstances could the government prevail). The Court
agreed with respondent who argued that "unless the Government has some obligation to disclose the factual basis for its assessments. . . , [t]he taxpayer can never know, unless the Government tells him, what the basis for the assessment is and thus can never show that the
Government will certainly be unable to prevail." Id. at 626-27.
97. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
98. However, Congress has given some indication that underlying data should be made
available to the taxpayer. The House Report for Chapter 13 states, "the trustee is also en-
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Section 7517, also enacted as part of TRA '76, provides that if the Secretary
makes or proposes a determination of the value of an item for purposes of the
estate, gift, or generation-skipping tax, he shall furnish upon request to the
person required to make the return a written statement explaining the basis for
valuing the property. 99 According to the legislative history, the statute was enacted to equalize the ability of the taxpayer and of the Internal Revenue Service
to question any valuation. 100 Section 7517 thus enhances the adversariness of
our estate and gift taxing system with regard to valuation, and perhaps may
provide the "foot in the door" for a Chapter 13 taxpayer to argue his right to
receive Internal Revenue Service data necessary to question other aspects of the
generation-skipping rates provided.
Thus far the focus of discussion has been the inadequacy of section
2603(a)(2) as a disclosure provision. It simply does not answer the questions of
who may request rates from the Internal Revenue Service, when requests will
be honored, or what additional information will be released. The vagueness of
section 2603(a)(2) in these respects may be because the main purpose of the
statute is to limit the liability of trustees, and the release of rates under the
statute is only an adjunct to that goal.' 0 ' The vagueness may also have been
intentional in order to give the Internal Revenue Service sufficient leeway to
draw up its own procedures. 0 2 However, an analysis of the reasons for the inadequacy of section 2603(a)(2) is not as important as a study of the other means
obtaining the information necessary to
available to the Chapter 13 taxpayer for
03
compute the generation-skipping tax.
Disclosure UnderSection 6103
Section 6103 is the principal Code provision controlling disclosure of tax
returns and tax return information. Section 6103(a) states the general rule of
nondisclosure of any return0 4 or return information0 5 that can be identified
titled to request from the Service a statement concerning the Service's basis for valuing property included in the generation-skipping transfer." Housa REPORT, supra note 19, at 58 n.16,
1976-3 C.B. 792.
99. X.R.C. §7517(a)-(b).
100. "Under present law, the value of the gross estate or the value of a gift is reported by
the executor of an estate or donor of a gift, as the case may be, at what he believes to be fair
The Secretary or his delegate is authorized to make such inquiry as is
market value ....
necessary to determine the correctness of the return of the taxpayer and make a determination .... In these situations, there is no administrative provision under present law which
provides an affirmative requirement on the part of the Internal Revenue Service to disclose the
method or basis by which the Service arrived at its determination of value." HousE REPORT,
supra note 19, at 60, 1976-3 C.B. 794.
101. See discussion in text accompanying notes 74-78 supra.
102. See discussion in text accompanying note 72 supra.
103. Throughout the following discussion it will be assumed that the taxpayer cannot
obtain the necessary information directly from the deemed transferor either because the
deemed transferor is dead at the time of the transfer or because he is unwilling or unable to
supply the data to the taxpayer.
104. "Return" includes any tax or information return as well as any gupplemental
schedules or lists. I.R.C. §6103(b)(1).
105. "Return information" means "a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount
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with a particular taxpayer,106 "except as authorized by this title."'07- Several of
the exceptions to the general rule may be relevantos to the generation-skipping
taxpayer. Before discussing these exceptions, it is important to note that
Chapter 13 and section 6103 do not cross-reference to each other; therefore, it is
not entirely clear that a Chapter 13 taxpayer may avail himself of any of the
provisions of section 6103 to obtain information for computing the generationskipping tax.
The argument that section 6103 can be used by generation-skipping taxpayers finds support in section 2621(a) of Chapter 13 which states, "Insofar as
applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter," all provisions of subtitle F (which includes section 6103) are applicable to Chapter
13.109 The legislative history of Chapter 13 indicates that the principal inconsistency with subtitle F anticipated by Congress was in the area of filing requirements11 Since section 6103 does not deal with filing requirements, one
may reasonably argue that section 6103 is not inconsistent with and is therefore
applicable to Chapter 13.
The contrary argument requires a brief explanation of Internal Revenue
Code section 644, also enacted by TRA '76. Section 644 adopts a vicarious taxing scheme, similar to that of Chapter 13, in which the tax on the gain from the
sale of certain appreciated property held in trust is paid out of the trust fund
but is taxed at the rates of the grantor."' Obviously, section 644 requires that
the trustee, who is required to file the tax return,112 have access to the grantor's
marginal tax rates. Congress took note of this necessity by enacting section
6103(e)(1)(A)(ii) which permits the trustee, upon written request, to inspect the
grantor's return "to the extent necessary to ascertain any amount of tax imposed upon the trust by section 644."11a
The similarity of the taxpayer's informational needs under Chapter 13 and
under section 644 accenuates the absence of any reference to Chapter 13 in
section 6103. Did Congress intentionally omit from section 6103 any provision
regarding Chapter 13 or was the omission merely an oversight?
One bit of legislative history indicates that the omission is merely an oversight. In making the 1976 amendments to section 6103, Congress reviewed each
of the areas in which returns and return information were subject to disclosure. With respect to each of these areas Congress strove to "balance the
of his income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits .

furnished to, or collected by the Secretary with respect to a return .
106.

.

. or any other data ...

I.R.C. §6103(b)(2)(A).

I.R.C. §6103(b)(2).

107. Id. §6103(a).
108. The nonrelevant exceptions in I.R.C. §6103 deal with disclosures to various federal
and state agencies or officials.
109. I.R.C. §2621(a).
110. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 48, at 617, 1976-3 C.B. 967, states that generationskipping transfers are generally subject to the procedural rules of subtitle F, but that specific
provisions of the Conference Agreement may override this general rule in the area of filing
requirements.
Ill. I.R.C. §644.
112. Id.
113. I.R.C. §6103(e)(1)(A)(ii). See ABA REPORT, supra note 38, at 5-8, 15-16 for a more
detailed discussion of the privacy and disclosure problems created by I.R.C. §644.
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particular office or agency's need for the information involved with the citizen's
."14 The areas "subject to disclosure" reviewed by Congress
right to privacy. ...
included only the already existing areas of potential governmental abuse that
had originally prompted the amendment of section 6103 and did not include
the new areas of potential private abuse created by Chapter 13.15 Furthermore,
since the generation-skipping tax provisions were added to TRA '76 by the
Conference Committee in its last day of deliberations" 6 and were therefore not
officially before the Senate committee which had sponsored the amendments to
section 6103,11 it is quite probable that the omission of a reference to Chapter
8
13 in amended section 6103 is due to mere legislative oversight."1 Assuming,
then, that section 6103 is applicable to information seekers under Chapter 13,
the relevant portions of section 6103 must be examined to determine what information may be sought, under what circumstances, and by whom.
If the deemed transferor is dead at the time of the generation-skipping
transfer, section 6103(e)(1)(E) and section 6103(e)(3) may allow disclosure of
certain types of information to certain classes of taxpayers. Section 6103(e)(1)(E)
permits disclosure of estate tax returns to "(ii) any heir at law, next of kin, or
beneficiary under the will, of the decedent, but only if the Secretary finds that
such heir at law, next of kin, or beneficiary has a material interest which will
be affected by information contained therein ... ."119 Section 6103(e)(3) sim-

ilarly allows' disclosure of the "return of a decedent" to an heir, next of kin,
beneficiary or donee of property. 120 The "return of a decedent" is not defined by
statute and is susceptible to several interpretations. Broadly construed, the term
would mean any return in which the decedent had been the taxpayer and
would include all income and gift tax returns. A more narrow construction
would limit the term to the final income tax return of the decedent filed on his
behalf by his executor or personal representative. Assuming this term is given
its more liberal construction,' 2 1 section 6103(e)(3) could aid Chapter 13 taxpayers who fall within the appropriate classes of persons by allowing them
access to the gift tax returns of the deemed transferor.
With gift tax returns obtained under section 6103(e)(3) and estate tax returns obtained under section 6103(e)(1)(E), a taxpayer should be able to com114. S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 315, 318, 1976-3 C.B. 353, 356.
115. The areas reviewed are discussed in the Senate Report. No mention is made of
Chapter 13 situations. Id. at 319-39, 1976-3 C.B. 357-77.
116. The Senate Finance Committee had added its own estate and gift tax reform provisions to the general TRA '76, SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 13, 1976-3 C.B. 655; however,
virtually no hearings were held on these provisions. See Dodge, supra note 4, at 1269 n.21.
The generation-skipping provisions that were finally adopted by the full Congress came out of
the House Bill, H.R. 14844, with some amendments, and were addended to the general tax
reform bill that had been under consideration in the Senate. Id. at 1268-69 n.21.
117. The House version of TRA '76 contained no provisions regarding amendments to
I.R.C. §6103. CONFERENcE REPORT, supra note 48, at 475, 1976-3 C.B. 879.,
118. ABA REPORT, supra note 38, at 8.
119. I.R.C. §6103(e)(1)(E)(ii).
120. I.R.C. §6103(e)(3)(B).
121. The ABA Report assumes that the term includes gift tax returns of the decedent.
ABA RFPORT, supra note 38, at 10. This assumption is supported by the inclusion of donees
in the classes of persons qualifying under I.R,C. §6103(e)(3).
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pute the deemed transferor's marginal transfer tax rate, but only if the deemed
2
transferor has not been credited with other generation-skipping transfers.1 2
Since the deemed transferor is not the taxpayer with regard to generationskipping transfers, prior generation-skipping tax returns would not be included
in the term "return of a decedent" and would therefore not be available under
section 6103(e)(3).
Thus, under circumstances where the deemed transferor is dead and has not
made other generation-skipping transfers, sections 6103(e)(1)(E) and 6103(e)(3)
together may provide certain Chapter 13 taxpayers with enough information to
compute the deemed transferor's tax rate or test the accuracy of rates supplied
by the Internal Revenue Service under section 2603(a)(2) procedures.
As a general rule, under both sections 6103(e)(1)(E) and 6103(e)(3), tax return information, which refers to any data related to a tax return and in the
possession of the Internal Revenue Service,123 will also be disclosed to any of
the persons authorized to inspect the return. 2 4 The Secretary may, however,
refuse to disclose tax return information if he determines that such disclosure
will seriously impair Federal tax administration. 12s One of the principal "impairments" that concerned Congress in this area is the potential chilling effect
on our self-assessment tax system caused by the threat of Internal Revenue
Service disclosure of tax return information to third parties.12 6 The Internal
Revenue Service could, therefore, refuse to disclose tax return information to
Chapter 13 taxpayers, particularly if the claimed need for such information
arose from a desire merely to verify the accuracy of rates already supplied by
the Service and not from a need to compute the rates. 2 7 The extent of the information that can be obtained under these subsections of section 6103(e) is
thus uncertain.
Uncertainty also exists as to who is entitled to request information under
these statutes. Two requirements must be met. First, the person requesting the
returns must be a member of one of the designated classes, i.e., an administrator.
executor, or trustee of the estate or an heir, next of kin, beneficiary, or donee

122. The probability that the taxpayer will not be able to independently ascertain information regarding prior generation-skipping transfers of the deemed transferor is discussed in text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
123. I.R.C. §6103(b)(2). See note 105 supra.
124. I.R.C. §6103(e)(6). The Chapter 13 taxpayers who may qualify under these provisions are discussed in text accompanying notes 128-138 infra.
125. I.R.C. §6103(e)(6).
126. "Questions have been raised and substantial controversy created as to whether the
present extent of actual and potential disclosure of return and return information to other
Federal and State agencies for non-tax purposes breaches a reasonable expectation of privacy
on the part of the American citizen with respect to such information. This, in turn, has raised
the question of whether the public's reaction to this possible abuse of privacy would seriously
impair the effectiveness of our country's very successful voluntary assessment system which is
the mainstay of the Federal tax system." S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 317, 1976-3
C.B. 355.
127. In the similar I.R.C. §644 area, Congress has provided that the grantor's tax return
may be disclosed only "to the extent necessary to ascertain any amount of tax imposed upon
the trust by section 644 .... " I.R.C. §6103(e)(1)(A)(ii).
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(under section 6103(e)(3) only).128 Second, the person must have a "material
12 9
interest" in receiving the information.
A distributee taxpayer would qualify as "next of kin" since he will be a
child or more remote direct descendant of the deemed transferor. 30 Although
"material interest" is not defined in the statute, the distributee's interest in
computing and paying the generation-skipping tax would seem to be "material." The fact that the analagous taxpayer under section 644 is considered
to have a material interest lends further support to this contention. 13'
In the case of taxable terminations the trustee is charged with preparation
of the return,13 2 and a trustee will not necessarily be within any of the classes
of persons qualified to receive information under sections 6103(e)(1)(E) or
6103(e)(3).133 However, several arguments can be made that the trustee or
trustee equivalent should be able to request the information. First, section
6103(e)(1)(A)(ii) allows the trustee of a section 644 trust to request the tax returns of the grantor. Since the trustee of a generation-skipping trust is in an
analogous position, 34 he should also be permitted access to the returns of the
deemed transferor, at least to the extent such returns would be disclosed to
others under sections 6103(e)(1)(E) and 6103(e)(3). Second, since the trustee is
subject to personal liability for the generation-skipping tax, 35 he has a material interest in obtaining the information necessary to correctly compute the
tax. Third, even if the trustee may not receive the information directly from
the Internal Revenue Service, he could probably obtain it indirectly through
the distributee of the trust. Since the burden of the generation-skipping tax
falls first on the trust, 386 the distributee has at least an indirect material interest
in obtaining the information that will enable the tax to be properly computed.
Therefore, even in the case of taxable terminations when the distributee is not
the taxpayer, he should be able to request the tax return information from the
Service and could then pass the information along to the trustee. 37 In view of
the above the Service should eliminate this potential circuity by disclosing the
information directly to the trustee.
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing discussion of sections
6103(e)(1)(E) and 6108(e)(3) is that if the deemed transferor is dead at the time
of the generation-skipping transfer, the distributee, and probably the trustee,
128. I.R.C. §§6103(e)(1)(E) and 6103(e)(3).
129. Id.
130. See I.R.C. §2612(a) and text accompanying notes 22-24 supra. Of course, the distributee, under appropriate circumstances, may also qualify as an executor or as one of the other
classes of permissible recipients.

131. See I.R.C. §6103(e)(1)(A)(ii).
132. I.R.C. §2621(c)(I)(A)(ii).
133. In some cases the trustee may be an heir, executor, etc., but it is just as likely that the
trustee will be unrelated to the deemed transferor.
134. See text accompanying notes 111-113 supra.

135. I.R.C. §2603(a)(2).
136. See note 26 supra.
137. There is a remote possibility that the beneficiary could be penalized under I.R.C.

§7213(3) for unauthorized disclosure of such inforiaion, See discussion in text accompanying
note 200 infra.
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may request disclosure of the estate and possibly the gift tax returns of the
deemed transferor. However, this information may be insufficient to enable the
taxpayer to compute the generation-skipping tax if the deemed transferor has
made prior generation-skipping transfers. Also, if no estate tax return has been
filed,13s section 6103(e)(1)(E) will be of no assistance to the taxpayer.
By far the largest gap in the coverage of section 6103(e) is its inapplicability
to generation-skipping transfers occurring while the deemed transferor is alive.
A living deemed transferor who refuses to consent 3 9 to disclosure of his returns
or return information could seriously handicap the Chapter 13 taxpayer.
The taxpayer may, however, have some recourse under section 6103(h)(4)
which permits disclosure of a return or return information in a "Federal or
State judicial or administrative proceeding pertaining to tax administration,
but only ... if the treatment of an item reflected on such return is directly
related to the resolution of an issue in the proceeding ....140
A serious problem is whether the Chapter 13 taxpayer can initiate the type
of proceeding envisioned under section 6103(h)(4) for the sole purpose of obtaining disclosure of the deemed transferor's tax returns or return information.
The proceeding must pertain to "tax administration" which is defined in section 6103(b)(4) to mean "the administration, management, conduct, direction,
and supervision of the execution and application of the internal revenue
laws"'14 and includes "assessment, collection, enforcement, [and] litigation...
under such laws ....,"142
This government-oriented terminology together with the section 6103(h)
(4)(B) requirement that the treatment of the disclosed item on the return must
directly relate to the issue in the proceeding suggests that the proceeding envisioned is one in which disclosure of the information is not the key issue, but
is merely necessary to decide some ancillary point between the government and
the taxpayer. Thus, it seems that section 6103(h)(4) may not provide the taxpayer with a useful weapon to force government disclosure of information
necessary to compute a Chapter 13 return.
The Chapter 13 taxpayer's predicament may be summarized at this point.
It appears that a trustee or trustee equivalent may obtain release of the deemed
transferor's tax rates under authority implied by section 2603(a)(2). Distributee
taxpayers, on the other hand, are not covered by section 2603(a)(2) and presumably may not request the rates from the Internal Revenue Service. Even if
both distributees and trustees may obtain rates from the Service, in order to
test the accuracy of these rates and thereby to protect their due process rights,
these taxpayers must have access to the underlying information comprising the
relevant tax history of the deemed transferor. Section 6103(a) prescribes a general rule of nondisclosure of such information, but exceptions contained in

138. See text accompanying note 60-61 supra.
139. I.R.C. §6103(c) allows the Secretary to disclose returns of a taxpayer to third parties
whom the taxpayer designates in a written consent.
140. I.R.C. §6103(h)(4).
141. I.R.C. §6103(b)(4)(A)(i).

142. I.R.C. §6103(b)(4)(B).
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sections 6103(e) and (l) may enable both types of taxpayers to obtain this information. under limited circumstances.
The least statutory assistance to either type of taxpayer is available in situations in which the deemed transferor is alive at the time of the transfer and will
not consent to the disclosure. This situation is likely to arise often in view of
the detailed and confidential nature of the information required and the
deemed transferor's passive relationship to the generation-skipping trust. Thus,
it appears that the existing statutory framework offers little positive assistance
to the Chapter 13 taxpayer.
Privacy Rights of the Deemed Transferor
The courts have recognized that financial transactions can reveal much
about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs and that "[a]t some point,
governmental intrusion upon these areas would implicate legitimate expectations of privacy."'143 As presently structured, the generation-skipping tax requires disclosure of financial information of the deemed transferor to the
Chapter 13 taxpayer. 4 4 As one commentator has already noted, "if the new
generation-skipping tax has a constitutional Achilles heel, it is the utilization of
a deemed transferor's tax history in computing the amount of a tax." 45
Any number of situations can be imagined in which the deemed transferor
would oppose the disclosure of his tax information to a Chapter 13 taxpayer.
For example, a deemed transferor would hardly be happy to discover that
through disclosure of his gift tax returns, his son, the Chapter 13 taxpayer, had
learned that his father had already given a great portion of the son's expectancy
to charitable institutions. Similarly, a deemed transferor with no beneficial
interest or other connection with a generation-skipping trust justifiably would
resent disclosure of his gift tax returns to an institutional trustee equivalent
such as an insurance company. Such illustrations serve to demonstrate the potential sensitivity of information required to be reported in tax returns and the
justifiable claims a deemed transferor may have that unauthorized disclosure of
such information by the Internal Revenue Service violates his right of privacy.
But in order to determine the extent to which the new generation-skipping tax
may violate the deemed transferor's right of privacy, it is first necessary to examine the source and nature of the right of privacy in the tax arena.
Individual rights generally are not regarded as absolute and frequently
must be balanced against other compelling government interests.1 46 There is
143.

California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78 (1974) (Powell and Blackmun, J.J.,

concurring).
144. See discussion in text accompanying notes 39-65 supra.
145. R. STEPsrNs, G. MAxrsaxE, & S. LuND, supra note 2, 112.03(5). "Determination of the
applicable tax rates with reference to the tax history of someone who may have had nothing
whatsoever to do with the property and who is deemed to transfer it solely because he happens
to be a parent of the transferee, however, may be so artificial as to raise constitutional doubt."

Id.
146. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973) (state's interest in preserving life
of fetus after three months must be balanced against the mother's right to privacy). See generally Comment, Informational Privacy and Public Records, 8 PAc. L.J. 25, 26-27 (1977);

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol32/iss1/2

22

Anderson and Fitzpatrick: Tax Information Disclosures Under the Generation-Skipping Transfe
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII

no doubt that the need to tax is such a compelling government interest. The
Supreme Court has established that the congressional authority to tax 47 is entitled to a broad construction4 and may impinge on individual rights other149
wise constitutionally protected.

It is also well settled that the government may coerce disclosure of financial
information for the purpose of assessing and collecting taxes. 50 But, in the
Chapter 13 context, disclosure of financial data to the government is not at
issue; instead, the issue is whether government disclosure of tax information of
the deemed transferor to a Chapter 13 taxpayer, who may have no personal or
financial connection with the deemed transferor,15 ' and for a purpose not originally contemplated by the deemed transferor, violates the privacy rights of the
deemed transferor. In order to prevail on this issue, the deemed transferor must
assert a privacy right that includes the right to control the flow of financial information that has already been disclosed to government.
Many commentators have argued for such a broad view of the right of
privacy.52 Perhaps the most notable are Justices Warren and Brandeis, who
argued that the common law concept of "inviolate personality" secured to individuals the right to control dissemination of personal information.,5 The
constitutional foundation for the general right of privacy has never been clearly
identified;154 therefore, it is even more difficult to ascertain a constitutional

Whitaker, Taxpayer Privacy vs. Freedom of Information: Proposals to Amend Section 6103, 6
TAX ADVISEsR 198 (1975).
147. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl.
1.
148. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936).
149. E.g., United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927) (requirement of preparing and
filing tax returns not violative of privilege against self-incrimination); Brushaber v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24 (1915) (progressive tax rate not violative of due process clause of
fifth amendment); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911) (filing and publication of
corporate tax return not violative of fourth amendment).
150. "No power is more basic to the ultimate purpose and function of government than is
the power to tax. Nor can it be doubted that the proper and efficient exercise of this essential
governmental power may sometimes entail the possibility of encroachment upon individual
freedom." Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960). Accord, United States v.
Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 150 (1937).
151. Recall that the deemed transferor may be a distant ancestor of the distributee and
that the deemed transferor may have no control over the events resulting in the taxable distribution or termination. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
152. "A broad view of privacy would also require that a person who discloses information
to another be able to control the latter's disposition of that information." Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MIcH. L. REV. 971, 1225 n.1525 (1975). See
also A. MILLER, ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Parker,
A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275 (1974); Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
153. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. Rav. 193, 205 (1890). "The
common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extents
his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others." Id. at 198, citing
Yates, J., in Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2379 (1769).
154. Although an extended discussion of the search for a constitutional basis for the
right of privacy is beyond the scope of this paper, briefly, the Supreme Court has held alternatively that individual privacy is protected directly by the first amendment, Baird v. State Bar,
401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971) and Keyshian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); by the "zones of
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source for the extended right of privacy arguably infringed upon by the generation-skipping tax.
In an early tax decision, Hubbard v. Mellon,'5s taxpayers argued that a
57
statute 5 6 permitting public inspection of limited tax return information
violated the fourth amendment prohibition against illegal searches and seizures.
The court, however, held that public disclosure of such tax information did not
constitute a search or a seizure and was therefore not prohibited by the fourth
amendment.58 Thus, the deemed transferor under the generation-skipping tax
collides with the Mellon decision if he attempts to claim fourth amendment
protection from government disclosure of his tax information.
As with the right to privacy in general,5 9 the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights and the first amendment guarantees of personal freedoms are perhaps
privacy" emanating from the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484 (1965); and by our concept of due process, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
For a thorough discussion of the development of the right of privacy in the courts, see
Project, supra note 152, at 1282.
155. 5 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1925).
156. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §257(b), 43 Stat. 293.
157. The provision provided that the amount of income tax paid by each taxpayer and
his address would be available for public inspection. The stated purpose was to reduce tax
fraud. The provision was not reenacted in the Revenue Act of 1926. See Whitaker, supra, note
146, at 200.
158. Hubbard v. Mellon, 5 F.2d 764, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1925).
The court also analyzed the necessary relationship between the means chosen by Congress public disclosure of tax payments - and the goal sought to be accomplished - reduction of tax
fraud. Framing its question as follows, "Assuming that a person may lawfully be compelled to
disclose affairs of a distinctly private character to officers of the government, in order that an
income tax assessment may be made; has Congress the constitutional power to provide for
public inspection of such disclosures when such inspection is deemed appropriate and necessary to enforcement of the law, without which no assessment could be made?" The court concluded that the legislative means need only be "appropriate and adapted" to the purpose
sought to be accomplished even though the means "may cause many hardships and may prove
to be injurious to many persons." Id.
An equally lax means-end test was applied to legislative implementation of taxing goals in
the more recent decision of Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958 (M.D. Ind. 1976). In
upholding the constitutionality of the progressive tax rate structure, the Johnson court stated:
"Absent the complexities of the Internal Revenue Code, the Government would normally bear
the burden of demonstrating that no less burdensome means exist which would satisfy its
interests. Theoretically, a better answer than the present tax structure may exist, one which
either does not burden the plaintiffs or which burdens them to a lesser extent. But .. . this
court cannot xequire the Government to demonstrate more convincingly than it has that no
less burdensome means exist .... [T]o do so would be effectively to abrogate the constitutional taxing power of Congress." Id. at 974.
It should be noted, however, that the Johnson case did not juxtapose the Government's
taxing methods against the taxpayer's privacy rights. Arguably, a stricter means-end analysis
would apply if fundamental rights were involved. See note 164 infra. Cf. City of Carmel-bythe-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970), concerning the constitutionality of the California campaign financing and disclosure laws. In Carmel, the Court
found the state law unconstitutionally overbroad because no rational relationship existed
between the means chosen by the state (public disclosure of candidates' financial data) and
the legislative goal (avoiding conflicts of interest). Id.
159. See note 154 supra.
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the strongest constitutional bases for a right to control the flow of personal information. In Griswold v. Connecitcut,16 the Supreme Court implied that a
right to control the flow of information about oneself was within the penumbra
of the first amendment freedom of association: "In like context, we have protected forms of 'association' that are not political in the customary sense but
pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit of the members."'' G
The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970,162 which permits the government under certain conditions to obtain an individual's bank records, presents a threat to the
privacy of bank customers which is analogous to the threat faced by the deemed
transferor. Although the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act has been
upheld, 16 several members of the Supreme Court protested the invasion occasioned by the recordkeeping requirements of that Act, stating: "The fact that
one has disclosed private papers to the bank, for a limited purpose, within the
context of a confidential customer-bank relationship, does not mean that one
has waived all right to privacy of the papers.."16 4 This reasoning may be applied
equally to the deemed transferor/government relationship arising under Chapter 13. That is, although the demed transferor must disclose his tax information
to the government for the purpose of assessing and collecting the tax on his own
income or on his own transfers, 165 he may still retain constitutional privacy
rights in that information with respect to other governmental uses. In this
regard, the deemed transferor may perhaps be analogized to the user of the
payphone in Katz v. United States,66 who having paid the toll, was "entitled to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to
1 67
the world."
Although the Constitution may supply the fundamentals necessary to secure
a right to control the flow of tax information, the deemed transferor may have
an additional hurdle to cross if his tax information, once reported, is considered
a matter of public record. As the Supreme Court has stated, "Thus even the
prevailing law of invasion of privacy generally recognizes that the interests in
privacy fade when the information involved already appears on public rec68
ord."
Prior to TRA '76, section 6103(a) adopted the approach that tax returns
160. 381 U.s. 479 (1965).
161. Id. at 483. Cf. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 774, 533 P.2d 222, 234, 120 Cal. Rptr.
94, 106 (1975) ("Fundamental to our privacy is the ability to control circulation of personal
information."). See also Comment, supra note 146, at 29.
162. 12 U.S.C. §§1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959 and 31 U.S.C. §§1051-1062, 1081-1083, 1101-1105,
1121-1122 (1970).
163. California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
164. Id. at 95 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In a similar vein, Justice Douglas' dissent expresses his willingness to recognize privacy rights in financial information, "Where fundamental personal rights are involved .... the [Bank Secrecy] Act should be 'narrowly drawn'
to meet the precise evil." Id. at 86.
165. See note 150 supra.
166.

389 U.S. 347 (1967).

167. Id. at 352.
168. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975) (father of rape victim
sued members of press for invasion of privacy resulting from publication of daughter's name
as the rape victim).
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were public records, subject to inspection in accordance with regulations approved by the President or by executive order.269 Primarily in response to executive abuses of this privilege in the Watergate Era, 70 Congress amended
section 6103(a) so that now the general rule is one of confidentiality for tax
returns or return information.Y7 Since such tax information is now regarded as
confidential, the constitutional right to privacy in such information appears
much more secure.
The Privacy Act of 1974172 reflects a similar congressional concern for protecting individual privacy by prohibiting the misuse of federal records, including tax returns. 7 3 The Privacy Act embodies the congressional intent that
"the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by the
Constitution of the United Sta~es."' 74 The Act carries out this intent by establishing certain minimum information-gathering standards for all agencies to
protect the privacy and due process rights of the individual and to assure that
surrender of personal information is made with informed consent or with some
guarantees of the uses and confidentiality of the information3. 7 The Privacy
Act, then, is concerned not only with the collection of information but also
with the maintenance, use, and dissemination of information, thus adopting a
view of privacy broad enough to encompass the individual's right to control
the flow of personal financial information.
Assuming, then, the existence of a constitutional and statutory right to
privacy regarding one's tax information, albeit a right of uncertan dimensions,
the extent to which the Chapter 13 tax structure infringes on that right depends on the circumstances of disclosure and how much tax information is
disclosed.
The amount of tax information regarding the deemed transferor obtainable
169.

I.R.C. §6103(a), Pub. L. No. 89-713 §4(a) (effective November 2, 1966 to December

31, 1977). See Parnell, The Right to Privacy and the Administration of the Federal Tax Laws,

31

TAx LAw.

113, 119 (1977). For a legislative history of the privacy of tax returns in our

country see Whitaker, supra note 146, at 199-202 and Bowe, The Privacy Act of 1974: How It
Affects Taxpayers, Practitioners,and the InternalRevenue Service, 45 J. or TAx. 74, V6 (1976).

170. Congress feared that the public's reaction to this possible abuse of privacy would impair the effectiveness of our country's self-assessment tax system. See note 126 supra. Although
this fear was provoked by governmental abuses then confronting the nation, the privacy rights
of deemed transferors are subject to the same type of abuse by the private sector if taxpayers
under Chapter 13 may obtain extensive tax information about the deemed transferor.
171. I.R.C. §6103(a). See also earlier discussion of I.R.C. §6103 in text accompanying notes
104-107 supra.

172. 5 U.S.C. §552a (1974).
173. Congress has acknowledged that the Privacy Act affects disclosure of tax information.
S. REP. No. 94-938, supra note 123, at 316, 1976-3 C.B. 354. I.R.C. §7852(e) provides a limited
exception to the applicability of the Privacy Act to Code provisions by precluding the applicability of certain provisions of the Privacy Act which enable an individual to obtain
correction of public records concerning himself. I.R.C. §7852(e) states that these provisions
shall not be applied in the determination of any tax liability. In this way, taxpayers cannot
have their previously filed tax returns "corrected" through Privacy Act procedures, but must
instead resort to normal tax refund procedures.
174. 5 U.S.C. §552a (1974) (Congressional Findings and Statement of Purpose).
175. S.REP. No. 93-1183, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 6916, 6917.
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by the Chapter 13 taxpayer will be determined largely by whether the deemed
transferor is alive or dead at the time the information is requested. If the
deemed transferor is alive, section 6103(e) is not applicable thereby forcing the
taxpayer to rely on the release of rates by the Service under section 2603(a)(2).
Under section 2603(a)(2) two alternate assumptions must be considered.
First, the Internal Revenue Service will adopt a strict approach and will
release no more than the actual rates and amount of remaining grandchild
exclusion to the taxpayer. Would the release of rates alone 76 violate the
privacy of the deemed transferor? Superficially, tax rates alone do not appear
to reveal much confidential information about the deemed transferor; however,
if the taxpayer were in a position to know that no other generation-skipping
transfers had been attributed to the deemed transferor, then the taxpayer could
work backwards from the rate, using the tables in section 2001(c), to determine
the amount of the taxable lifetime gifts of the deemed transferor. The amount
of a person's gifts may be regarded as confidential 77 and the release of rates
which enable another person to compute the amount of these gifts would be a
violation of the deemed transferor's right to control the flow of information
about himself, unless, of course, the governmental interest in releasing the
rates outweighs this privacy interest. In cases where the taxpayer cannot obtain
the information to compute the rates on his own, the release of rates by the
Internal Revenue Service will be essential to a computation of the tax and such
governmental necessity may outweigh the relatively slight invasion of the
deemed transferor's privacy occasioned by the release of rates alone.
The alternative assumption under section 2603(a)(2) is that in order to
satisfy the Chapter 13 taxpayer's due process rights, the Internal Revenue Service will adopt procedures providing for the release of the deemed transferor's
relevant tax returns or tax return information. If the failure of Congress to
authorize disclosure of such information under section 6103(e) is due to mere
oversight, as is indicated by the legislative history,178 then it is fair to assume
that any legislative provision to correct this oversight will follow the guidelines
of section 6103(e)(1)(A)(ii) which permits disclosure of returns and return information in the analogous section 644 situation.179 With this in mind, the
Internal Revenue Service may, under its congressional grant of authority,' 8 '
adopt fairly liberal procedures implementing section 2603(a)(2).181
176. Release of the remaining grandchild exclusion as contemplated by I.R.C. §2603(a)
(2)(B) does not present privacy problems for the deemed transferor. This is because the grandchild exclusion is determined with respect to distributions to the grantor's grandchildren, not
those of the deemed transferor. I.R.C. §2613(b)(6).
177. See text accompanying note 143 supra.
178. See discussion in text accompanying notes 114-118 supra.
179. See text accompanying notes 111-113 supra.
180. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
181. Unless or until Congress explicitly authorizes disclosuxe of information through
I.R.C. §6103 to Chapter 13 taxpayers, any release of tax returns or return information through
regulations adopted under Chapter 13 may be a violation of the Privacy Act. Congress has
acknowledged that the general prohibition under the Privacy Act against disclosure of public
records concerning an individual without that individual's consent extends to tax information.
See note 174 supra. In the 1976 Amendments to I.R.C. §6103, Congress also stated that tax
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The release of the deemed transferor's tax returns or return information
could present potentially greater privacy problems than the release of rates
alone. Accordingly, the governmental interest in releasing such information
would have to be greater in order to justify the increased privacy invasion.
Again, if the release of returns is necessary for a computation of the tax, the
deemed transferor's privacy fights may be outweighed. But if the release is
merely to satisfy the taxpayer's desire to verify the accuracy of Internal Revenue
Service rates, then the balance may be struck in favor of the deemed transferor.
If the deemed transferor is dead, the Chapter 13 taxpayer may be able to
obtain release of certain of the deemed transferor's tax returns and return information under section 6103(e). However, the death of the deemed transferor
raises different privacy considerations because whatever privacy right the
8
deemed transferor may have had in his tax information dies with him. 2
Although there is some disagreement as to the extent of the right, some
courts have found that survivors of a deceased person have a relational right of
privacy.1 3 This right is not an extension of the deceased's personal right of
8
privacy, but is a facet of the survivor's own personal right of privacy. 4 Thus,
in order to claim this right in a Chapter 13 situation, a relative or heir of the
deemed transferor would have to show that his own privacy was violated by the
disclosure of tax information about the deemed transferor.
The release of the deemed transferor's estate tax return, which includes a
copy of the will, could well violate the privacy of heirs of the estate or of other
surviving family members. Similarly, the release of gift tax returns could violate
the privacy of the deemed transferor's donees or other survivors. In order to
determine whether tax disclosures after the deemed transferor's death are
records could be disclosed without consent to the extent permitted under this section. S. REP.
No. 94-938, supra note 123, at 316, 1976-3 C.B. at 354. Disclosures under I.R.C. §2603(a)(2)
regarding a live deemed transferor are not yet authorized by I.R.C. §6103 and may therefore
be subject to the Privacy Act restrictions. See 5 U.S.C. §552(a), (b) & (e) (1976) for a list of
the conditions and restrictions that must be satisfied before information may be disclosed
under the Privacy Act. See also discussion of some of these restrictions in text accompanying
notes 186-190 infra.
182. The right of privacy is personal and therefore does not survive the deceased.
Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22 (1895). Accord, James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 174
Cal. App. 2d 650, 344 P.2d 799 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co., 160 Cal.
App. 2d 718, 325 P.2d 659 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
183. A relational right of privacy was one of the bases for decision in the following cases:
Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n, 91 Colo. 544, 17 P.2d 535 (1932); Bazemore v.
Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930); and Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149
S.W. 849 (1912).
The United States Supreme Court in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975),
granted appeal to a case in which a father sued in his own name for invasion of privacy
caused by publication of his daughter's name as a rape victim. Although the case was decided
on other grounds, the Court did not question the standing of the father to bring such an
action and thereby impliedly recognized a relational right of privacy.
184. Gruschus v. Curtis Publishing Co., 342 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1965) (action for invasion
of privacy does not survive the death of the party whose privacy was invaded unless the plaintiff's privacy was also invaded). See generally Note, The Relational Right of Privacy Theory Recovery on the Basis of Conduct Directed at a Deceased or Living Relative, Friend, or Associate, 21 RuT. L. REv. 74 (1966).
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constitutionally permissible, the survivor's relational right of privacy would
have to be balanced against the governmental interest in disclosure in the same
manner as discussed above with regard to the deemed transferor's right of
privacy.
Compounding the privacy problems of deemed transferors and their survivors is the fact that existing laws offer virtually no assurance that the information released to Chapter 13 taxpayers will be restricted to its proper use. Under
the Privacy Act of 1974, confidential information that can be identified with
the taxpayer 8 5 may not be released unless proper measures are taken to insure
its proper use and continuing confidentiality. Some of the safeguards required
by the Privacy Act are assurance that measures will be taken to prevent injury
to the character or reputation of the individual whose data is released; 18 6 that
efforts will be made to notify the individual that his record has been released,187 that the actual use of the information will be consistent with the
reasons given upon request; 188 and that the recipient of the information has
adopted rules for maintaining the confidentiality of the information.1s9 None
of the provisions in Chapter 13 or section 6103 requires any similar precautions
for disclosures to Chapter 13 taxpayers.19° If Congress or the Internal Revenue
Service were to adopt similar procedures safeguarding the release of information under Chapter 13, then perhaps the invasion of the deemed transferor's
privacy could be minimized.
The only existing provision of the Internal Revenue Code that may be used
to deter improper use of deemed transferor tax information by the Chapter 13
taxpayer is section 7213, which prescribes various penalties for unauthorized
disclosure of tax information. Section 7213(a)(1) penalizes Federal officers and
employees for improper disclosure of returns or return information to any
person. 19' This provision might inhibit the Internal Revenue Service from disclosing tax information to the Chapter 13 taxpayer, but would not penalize
Chapter 13 taxpayers who disclose the information received from the Internal
Revenue Service to other persons.
185. Congressional concern for the confidentiality of specifically identifiable taxpayer information was also expressed by the enactment of I.R.C. §6110. Section 6110(a) permits the
text of any "written determination and background file document" to be open for public
inspection, but I.R.C. §6110(c)(1) requires that the "names, addresses, and other identifying
details of the person to whom the written determination pertains" be deleted from the de-

termination or file before it is made public.
186. 5 U.S.C. §552a(e)(10) (1976).
187. Id. §552a(e)(8).
188. Id. §552a(b)(5).
189. Id.
190. As part of the 1976 amendments to I.R.C. §6103, Congress now requires that as
a precondition to the release of information under the exceptions to §6103(a), the Internal Revenue Service must assure itself that the agency requesting the information has
adopted procedures to insure the proper use and continued confidentiality of information to
be released. This restriction applies only to government agencies, however, and would therefore not protect the disclosure of deemed transferor information to private Chapter 13 taxpayers. See I.R.C. §6103(p)(4).
191. Violation of this section is a felony punishable by a fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment up to five years, or both, and by discharge from office. I.R.C. §7213(a)(1).
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Section 7213 (a)(3), on the other hand, could be applied to private persons.
That section states that it shall be unlawful for any person "to whom any return
or return information... is disclosed in a manner unauthorized by this title
to thereafter print or publish in any manner not provided by law any such
return or return information."'192 However, this statute is not effective in protecting the privacy of deemed transferors for two reasons. First, the information
is disclosed under section 2603(a)(2) or section 6103(e) to the Chapter 13 taxpayer through authorized channels. Secondly, the statute would not penalize
verbal disclosures, which can harm the deemed transferor or his survivors just as
much as printed disclosures.
ALTEIYNATiVES FOR MINIMIZING THE CONFLICT

The goal of Chapter 13 is to impose a tax on generation-skipping transfers
that otherwise would have escaped taxation. The particular method chosen by
Congress attempts to tax the transfers at the same rate they would have been
taxed had the generation-skipping device not been employed. The plan, though
logical, presents a very serious conflict between the due process rights of the
taxpayer and the privacy rights of the deemed transferor. The question then
arises: Could Congress adopt an alternative method for taxing generationskipping transfers that would eliminate or, at least, reduce this conflict?
The crux of the conflict is the taxpayer's need to obtain detailed financial
information about the deemed transferor in order to compute or test the
deemed transferor's marginal transfer tax rate. The most logical alternatives to
the existing scheme center on finding a substitute for the deemed transferor's
tax rate - a substitute that would not require knowledge of another taxpayer's
tax history in order to compute the tax rate.
One alternative is to tax generation-skipping transfers at a uniform rate to
be designated by Congress. The primary shortcoming of this simplest of alternatives is that, unless the rate is set at the highest possible transfer tax rate, some
grantor's of generation-skipping trusts would benefit from the nonprogressivity
of the rate. That is, grantors in a high transfer tax bracket could avoid the
penalties of the progressive unified rate scheme for their own transfers by establishing generation-skipping trusts that take advantage of the lower, flat rate on
generation-skipping transfers. Aside from the practical difficulties of selecting
an appropriate flat rate, this method presents the very same possibilities for
abuse by wealthy grantors that Congress sought to eliminate by enacting Chap3
ter 13.19
A slightly more sophisticated version of the preceding method would be to
apply a progressive rate to generation-skipping transfers based on the amount
of the transfer in question. Thus, the larger the amount of the transfer,, the
higher the rate of tax applied. However, such a system would be merely an

invitation for sophisticated grantors to fractionalize the distributions of generation-skipping trusts so that each individual taxable transfer would be in the
smallest amount practicable and thereby subjected to lower rates.
192.

I.R.C. §7213(a)(3).

193. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
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Another possibility is to tax the genertion-skipping transfer at the distributee's marginal tax rate. The base for such a tax would be comprised of all the
generation-skipping transfers received by the distributee plus all of his actual
gifts made to others. The distributee should have first-hand access to all the
information needed to compute such a tax thereby eliminating the invasion of
privacy problems of the existing Chapter 13 method.19 4 Furthermore, the progressivity of transfer tax rates would be retained, with the marginal rates of the
distributee being substituted for those of the deemed transferor.
The theoretical underpinnings of this approach are its greatest weakness.
The rate is determined by combining receipts with transfers of the distributee,
which is very much like mixing apples and oranges. The marginal rate base of
the distributee determined under this method becomes then, not a transfer tax,
but a hybrid of a transfer and an inheritance tax. However, if this hybridization
could be tolerated, the system does offer the very real benefits of making the
information gathering process much less burdensome on the taxpayer and of
reducing, or eliminating, privacy violations.
A final alternative suggests using the marginal rates of the grantor to tax
the generation-skipping transfer. Since the grantor's marginal rates are likely
to be higher than those of the deemed transferor, 19s the use of such higher rates
would discourage many uses of generation-skipping trusts - a goal certainly
within the congressional consciousness. 1 1
Using the grantor's rates would also involve some invasion of the grantor's
privacy since the taxpayer would have the same need for the grantor's tax rates
and underlying information to test the accuracy of those rates as he now has for
the deemed transferor's tax rates and return information. Nonetheless, if a
choice must be made between invading the privacy of the grantor or of the
deemed transferor, fairness dictates that the grantor is the more proper victim.
After all, the grantor, and not the deemed transferor, is responsible for establishing the generation-skipping trust. By designating the trustee and the distributees, the grantor has also chosen who will later need the tax information.
Similarly, the grantor's structuring of the trust determines to some extent when
a taxable transfer will take place and the grantor thus has some control over
whether the tax information will be sought before or after his own death. In
97
the burden of
short, if a vicarious taxing system is to be adopted at all,'

194. This assumes that in the case of taxable terminations in which the trustee must
prepare the return, the distributee would voluntarily supply the necessary information regarding his own rates to the trustee. Since the tax becomes a lien on the property, I.R.C.
§2603(b), it would certainly be in the distributee's financial interest to provide the trustee
with information necessary to properly compute the tax.
195. Indeed, the disparity in marginal rates between the grantor and beneficiary is often
a primary motivating force for establishing generation-skipping trusts.

196.

See note 7 supra.

197.

The ABA Report, in its discussion of alternatives to the analogous I.R.C. §644 con-

flict between due process and privacy, suggests that the grantor himself should pay the tax.
While this might be a feasible solution in the §644 setting, it would raise serious problems if
applied to generation-skipping transfers. For example, in establishing the trust, the grantor
most likely will pay a gift or estate tax. Imposing a second transfer tax on a subsequent

transfer of the same property over which the grantor no longer has control might raise con-

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1979

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 2

1979]

GENERATION-SKIPPING

TRANSFERS

privacy invasion should fall upon the party actively responsible for creating
the generation-skipping trust.
Undoubtedly, other alternatives for taxing generation-skipping transfers
could be suggested. But assuming that Congress will not alter the basic structure
of Chapter 13, consideration should be given to procedural safeguards that may
be enacted to minimize the conflict between the taxpayer's need to know and
the deemed transferor's right to privacy.
The first step is to analyze precisely what information a taxpayer will need
in computing the generation-skipping tax. The elements of the deemed transferor's marginal transfer tax rate base and the information for the specific deductions and credits allowed by section 2602(c) have been previously discussed. 198 Congress should then provide specific statutory authorization for the
release of this information by the Internal Revenue Service when the taxpayer
cannot obtain the information on his own. The authorization could be incorporated within Chapter 13 itself or could be in an amendment to section
6103 similar to that made for section 644 trusts. Congress should specify that
only the information necessary for preparing the return will be released, perhaps establishing procedures for deletion of unnecessary data from returns
before their release. Congress must also specifically state who is eligible to receive tax information regarding the deemed transferor. Any taxpayer under
Chapter 13 - trustee, trustee equivalent, or distributee - should be allowed to
request the information necessary to prepare a generation-skipping tax return.
Additionally, a resolution must be made of the problem of determining the
amount of the remaining unified credit available for offset against the generation-skipping tax when no estate tax return was required to be filed for the
deemed transferor. 199 A practical solution may be to designate that in such
cases the unified credit need be reduced only by the credit used up in known
taxable intervivos gifts rather than by the full tax imposed under section 2001.
Admittedly, this approach would give some generation-skipping taxpayers a
slight tax advantage; however, the cost of determining the amount of and
eliminating that advantage, both in terms of administrative hassle and privacy
invasion, may not be justified.
Threats to the deemed transferor's privacy could also be minimized by
adopting specific safeguards similar to those of the Privacy Act 200 for insuring
that tax information will be released only to authorized persons and will be
put to its intended use. Perhaps the simplest method of providing these safeguards would be to make the Privacy Act specifically applicable to releases of
tax information under Chapter 13. Additionally, penalties for improper use of
information received from the Internal Revenue Service or for unauthorized
disclosure, whether written or verbal, of such information to third parties
should be enacted into section 7213.
stitutional due process questions. Secondly, in many instances, at the time the generationskipping transfer is deemed to occur, the grantor would be long since dead, and the assets of
his estate distributed, and thus there would be no fund from which to pay the tax.

198. See text accompanying notes 39-65 supra.
199. See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
200. See text accompanying notes 186-189 supra.
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CONCLUSION

In enacting the generation-skipping tax provisions, Congress has not given
adequate consideration to the due process and privacy ramifications of the
taxing system thereby established. Neither adequate means of obtaining the
information necessary to prepare the generation-skipping tax returns nor adequate safeguards against unwarranted disclosures of confidential tax information of the deemed transferor have been provided.
The invasion of the deemed transferor's privacy virtually necessitated by
the generation-skipping tax structure and countenanced by section 6103 may
lead to valid questioning of the constitutionality of Chapter 13. Furthermore,
knowledge that their tax information may be involuntarily disclosed to other
individuals under Chapter 13 provisions may cause taxpayers to be less complete in their disclosures to the government thereby causing a gradual deterioation of our voluntary tax assessment system.
Thus, although Congress may have the constitutional authority to impose a
tax system requiring disclosure of tax information of the deemed transferor,
Congress should consider whether it is willing to risk this potential chilling
effect on the self-assessment ssytem. The seriousness of these problems warrants
congressional consideration of alternative methods of taxing generation-skipping transfers or, at least, statutory safeguards for the deemed transferor's
privacy rights.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1979

33

